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Abstract
International migration is costly and initially only the middle class of the wealth dis-
tribution may have both the means and incentives to migrate, increasing inequality in
the sending community. However, the migration networks formed lower the costs for
future migrants, which can in turn lower inequality. This paper shows both theoretically
and empirically that wealth has a nonlinear eect on migration, and then examines the
empirical evidence for an inverse U-shaped relationship between emigration and inequal-
ity in rural sending communities in Mexico. After instrumenting, we ﬁnd that the overall
impact of migration is to reduce inequality across communities with relatively high lev-
els of past migration. We also ﬁnd some suggestive evidence for an inverse U-shaped
relationship among communities with a wider range of migration experiences.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The United States-Mexico border is the longest between a developed and developing country in the
world and there is a long history of migration between the two countries. Escobar Latapí et al. (1998)
report that the number of Mexicans employed in the United States in a typical year is equivalent to
one-eighth of Mexico’s labor force.1 This paper examines the impact of these large emigrant ﬂows
on inequality in the rural sending communities in Mexico. Inequality is often of intrinsic interest for
a variety of political and equity-based considerations. In addition, income distribution in Mexico
displays a high level of inequality by international standards, and there is now a large body of both
theoretical and empirical research which suggests that inequality can retard growth.2 To the extent
that emigration is non-neutral with respect to inequality, it can therefore have important political
and growth consequences for rural Mexico.
What is the overall impact of international migration on economic inequality at origin? The
answer to this question is a priori unclear, depending on where migrants are drawn from in the initial
wealth or income distribution, and on the impacts of their migration decisions on other community
members. Initial wealth plays two key roles in determining whether a given individual will migrate.
Households at the top of a community’s income distribution have lower incentives to send members
abroad than middle- and low-income households, since their income earning opportunities and social
status are higher to begin with. However, while the poorest rural households may stand to beneﬁt
the most from emigration, migration is costly and in the presence of liquidity constraints, they
may be unable to bear the cost of sending members abroad. The result is that if migration costs
are sizeable, migrants are initially primarily drawn from households at the upper-middle of the
community wealth distribution, causing inequality to initially increase as these households get richer
from income earned abroad. In contrast, if migration costs are low or liquidity constraints do not
bind, the lower part of the distribution is also able to migrate, resulting in a more neutral or even
1Measurement of the exact number of migrants is notoriously di!cult, due in large part to substantial temporary
migration of a highly seasonal nature and to most of the migration being undocumented. See USCIR (1998) for
discussion and estimates.
2See, for example, the recent surveys by Benabou (1996) and Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis (1999).
2inequality-reducing eect of migration income.
Most migrants making their ﬁrst trip from Mexico to the U.S. do so without documents, making
the process of migrating an even more risky and costly enterprise. Sociologists have emphasized the
role that social networks play in reducing these costs. Espinosa and Massey (1997) report that social
networks play an important role in mitigating the hazards of crossing the border, with friends and
relatives with previous migrant experience often accompanying new immigrants across the border,
showing them preferred routes and techniques of clandestine entry. They can arrange smugglers,
or “coyotes”, to transport the migrant across the border, and may provide temporary housing and
ﬁnancial assistance in the U.S. Munshi (2003) ﬁnds that individuals with larger networks are more
likely to be employed and to hold higher paying jobs upon arrival in the U.S. As a result, net mi-
gration costs become endogenous to the migration process, as modelled theoretically in Carrington,
Detragiache and Vishwanath (1996), and migration is therefore likely to have dierent eects on
inequality at dierent levels of the migration process, as suggested by Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki
(1986). Indeed, in the presence of liquidity constraints and initially high migration costs, the ﬁrst
households to migrate are likely to be from the upper end of the income distribution, and conse-
quently, their remittances tend to increase inter-household inequality. However, villagers who have
successfully migrated can then provide information to other community members, lowering their
eective migration costs and allowing migration to diuse throughout the remainder of the income
distribution, reversing any initially unfavorable eects of remittances on income inequality.
We begin by writing down a simple theoretical model of rural migration, show that it leads to an
inverse U-shaped relationship between migration and wealth for a given cost of migration, and then
examine the consequences of changes in costs and beneﬁts which might arise from the presence of
networks. This non-monotone migration-wealth relationship is then conﬁrmed empirically in data
from Mexico, and we ﬁnd that networks still play a strong role in the migration decision, even after
controlling for wealth. The main focus of our paper then lies in examining the empirical evidence
for an inverse U-shaped relationship between emigration and inequality in the sending communities.
We employ two data sets for this purpose. The ﬁrst consists of data from 57 rural communities
3in Mexico collected as part of the Mexican Migration Project (MMP), while the second consists of
data on 97 rural municipalities from the national demographic dynamics survey (ENADID). Both
data sets provide detailed information on migration, but do not collect income or consumption
data. To measure inequality, we therefore employ methods recently developed in McKenzie (2003),
which allow us to measure inequality at the community level from data on indicators of household
infrastructure and asset ownership. This enables us to construct data on inequality and migration
for a large number of communities with a range of dierent migration experiences, in contrast to
previous case studies which focus on only a couple of villages, typically in areas of high emigration.
The MMP surveys ask retrospective histories of migration, and enable us to examine the impact
of past emigration to the U.S. on current inequality among members of sending communities in
Mexico. Since there are likely to be unobserved factors correlated with both the migration decision
and current inequality, we employ an instrumental variables strategy to isolate the overall eect
of migration on inequality, allowing for nonlinearity in this relationship. The main instruments
employed are historic state-level migration rates and U.S. labor market conditions. Using this
instrumenting strategy, we ﬁnd that migration reduces inequality among the MMP communities,
with a larger eect on asset inequality than on income or consumption inequality. Many of the
MMP communities have high levels of past migration, which may mean they are already past any
turning point in the inequality-migration relationship. The ENADID therefore allows us to examine
communities with a wider range of migration levels, and since we have data on these communities
for both 1992 and 1997, determine whether changes in migration result in changes in inequality
over this period. In these communities we do ﬁnd some suggestive evidence for an inverse U-shaped
relation, with the turning point occurring before the migration levels of many MMP communities.
As noted above, previous literature has not examined the overall impact of migration on inequal-
ity, focusing instead on examination of the eect of remittances alone on inequality in only a couple
of communities.3 Early eorts treated remittance income as an exogenous transfer, and compared
Gini coe!cients with and without the inclusion of remittance income. Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki
3See Rapoport and Docquier (2003) for an overview of the economic determinants and consequences of migrants’
remittances.
4(1986) analyzed the direct eect of remittance income in two villages in Michoacán, Mexico, by
comparing the Ginis with and without remittance income, and ﬁnd that in both cases, remittances
reduce inequality, but that the decline is greater in the village with more migration experience. They
took this ﬁnding to be supportive of their hypothesis that remittances have a more equalizing eect
at higher levels of past migration experience. Following a similar approach with national data from
Yugoslavia, Milanovic (1987) ﬁnds that remittances increase inequality among agricultural house-
holds. Noting that migrant workers would otherwise be working and earning income at home, Adams
(1989) predicts what income would have been without remittances. Using a sample of three villages
in Egypt, he then ﬁnds that the inclusion of remittances from abroad worsens inequality. In contrast,
following the same approach with households from 4 districts in Pakistan, Adams (1992) concludes
that remittances have an essentially neutral impact on the rural income distribution. Taylor (1992)
and Taylor and Wyatt (1996) note that in addition to the direct immediate impact on income,
remittances can ease credit constraints for liquidity constrained households. Using a sample of 55
households from one part of Michoacán in Mexico, they ﬁnd evidence that remittances translate into
greater increases in income for rural households with illiquid assets. By allowing poorer households
access to credit, remittances also ﬁnance the accumulation of productive assets, increasing future
income. These indirect eects of remittances act to equalize incomes, and they ﬁnd that remittances
reduce inequality, with a greater eect once the indirect eects are included. Barham and Boucher
(1998) follow on from Adams, in treating remittances as a substitute to home production. Using
data from 3 neighborhoods in Blueﬁelds, Nicaragua, they estimate a double-selection model to allow
for the counterfactual of no migration and no remittances to impact on the participation decisions
and earning outcomes of other household members. Treating remittances as exogenous would lead
them to conclude that remittances reduce income inequality, whereas treating them as a substitute
for home earnings results in remittances increasing inequality.
Our methods allow, and indeed force, us to examine the overall impact of migration on inequality.
This overall impact includes the direct eect of remittances and the spillover eects of remittances
on own production and household labor supply studied in the previous literature. However, it also
5includes the network eects of migration on the costs and beneﬁts of migration for other community
members, multiplier eects of remittances through their spending on products and services produced
by other community members (Adelman, Taylor and Vogel (1988)), and other potential spillover and
general equilibrium eects. Although we are unable to break down the separate eect of each channel
on inequality, we do believe these additional indirect eects are important and need to be included
in studying the migration-inequality relationship.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical model.
Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 summarizes the method used to construct measures of
inequality from data on asset indicators, and Section 5 empirically examines the eect of wealth and
networks on the migration decision. Section 6 contains the main results of the paper, examining the
eect of migration on inequality, while Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
Initial wealth plays two key roles in determining whether a given individual will migrate: increases
in wealth generally raise the returns to domestic production, increasing the opportunity cost of
migrating, but also relax credit constraints which restrict the amount of costly migration. We
provide a simple static model of an agricultural household’s migration decision to illustrate these
dual roles of wealth on migration, and derive the resulting relationship between migration, wealth,
and migration costs.
Consider a family of size N making its living from agriculture, with initial illiquid household
wealth A, such as land holdings. Family members are assumed to live for two periods. Since our
prime interest lies in the study of interhousehold inequality, we assume for simplicity that income
is income equally shared between members of the same family. In the ﬁrst period, all members
are in Mexico, and each household member inelastically supplies one unit of labor to household
production. Total farm production with L workers is AL bL2
2 . The marginal product of farm labor
is linearly increasing in wealth and decreasing in the number of workers4, and there is no outside labor
4All the model is written in terms of farm production, it can also be more generally applied to other home
6market.5 A household member can migrate to the U.S. and earn the foreign wage w by incurring
a ﬁxed migration cost c, which is initially assumed to be ﬁxed and exogenous.6 Credit market
imperfections prevent borrowing, and so no household member can migrate in the ﬁrst period. In
the second period, households may use savings from the ﬁrst period to ﬁnance migration, after having
met the ﬁrst period subsistence needs of I per member. We assume w>Iand that A  bN
2  I.
The household’s problem is to chose the proportion of members who migrate, m. W ea s s u m en o
discounting, so the household makes this decision to maximize second period household income net
of migration costs, subject to the subsistence constraint. That is, the household’s problem is:
max
{m}
AN (1  m) 
bN2 (1  m)
2
2




 mc  I (1)
Let  be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the subsistence constraint in (1). Then the ﬁrst-
order condition with respect to m is:
AN + bN2 (1  m)+N (w  c)  c =0
Rearranging, we can solve for the optimal household migration rate, m,a s :
m =1





The Lagrange multiplier  =0unless (1) binds. When (1) binds, we can solve for the constrained
migration rate:
production and family businesses, in which labor is a complement to capital in production.
5The assumption of no outside labor market allows us to abstract from general equilibrium eects on wages.
Docquier and Rapoport (2003) provide a model of remittances and inequality with a rural labor market, and show,
given ﬁx e dm i g r a t i o nc o s t s ,t h a tt h ed o m e s t i cw a g er e s p o n s e sc a na l s og i v er i s et oa ni n v e r s e - Us h a p e dr e l a t i o n s h i p
between migration and inequality.
6Since the majority of migration in our application is illegal, resulting in low returns to migrant capital, we assume
that the foreign wage is independent of A. Our main results continue to hold if w is a function of A provided that the
marginal productive (and psychic) returns to wealth at home eventually are greater than those abroad (w0 (A) < 1),
that is, there is some incentive to return to the home village. Otherwise, all who can meet the migration costs will
















2bNc  2[A  w + c]c  2bNA + b2N2 +2 bNI
¢
(4)
From (3) we can solve to ﬁnd the highest level of assets at which a household is constrained by





This level is higher the higher is subsistence income I, and the more household members there are
to reduce the marginal productivity of labor. Note that it does not depend on migration costs c,a s
subsistence concerns make these households unable to save anything in the ﬁrst period, so that they
can not migrate regardless of how low migration costs are.

















c2 (c + bN) (7)








bN when  =0
1
c when  > 0
(8)
Interpreting (8), we see that when subsistence constraints bind, increasing wealth increases migra-
tion, the extent to which depends on migration costs c. When subsistence constraints no longer
8bind, an increase in wealth merely causes the opportunity cost of migrating to increase in terms of
lost household production, and so households will reduce migration, the extent to which depends on
productivity. Using (2) and (3) to ﬁnd the level of level of A at which m = e m, and hence at which





b2N2 +2 bNI +2 bNc +2 cw  2c2
c + bN
(9)
Finally, we see in (8) that m is decreasing in A for A>A 1 ( =0 ). We can then ﬁnd the lowest
asset level at which unconstrained households will optimally choose no migration from (2) with
 =0:
A = bN +( w  c) (10)
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when A  A  A1
1 
[A(wc)]
bN when A1  A  A
0 when A  A
(11)
That is, a household’s migration rate will be a triangular function of assets, with migration increasing
with wealth at low levels, and decreasing with wealth at higher levels. In other words, as wealth
increases, the maximal number of migrants a given household can aord increases but the optimal
number decreases. Figure 1 shows this relationship.
Migration rates will thus ﬁrst increase and then decrease with wealth. The model as presented
does not incorporate risk. The migration itself along with the income it provides are risky, and so
decreasing absolute risk aversion will provide an additional reason for migration rates to increase with
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Figure 1: Relationship between Migration Rate (m) and Asset Wealth (A).
farm households to diversify their income portfolio, which will be a more important rationale for
migration for poorer households. Taken together, these factors should act to reinforce the inverse-U
shaped relationship between migration rates and initial wealth. Borjas (1987) oers an additional
reason why we might expect to see migration rates declining with wealth in Mexico. He shows that
migrants from a country with a more unequal income distribution than the U.S., as is the case with
Mexico, will be negatively selected. High inequality in Mexico increases the incentives for remaining
in Mexico for people in the top of the distribution. If we introduce borrowing constraints into his
model, then we would also see migration rates increasing with wealth at lower levels, as in Figure 1.
Massey, Goldring and Durand (1994) outline a cumulative theory of migration, which ﬁts well
with the assumptions of our model. They note that the ﬁrst migrants usually come from the lower
middle ranges of the socioeconomic hierarchy, and are individuals who have enough resources to
absorb the costs and risks of the trip, but are not so a"uent that foreign labour is unattractive.
Family and friends then draw on ties with these migrants to gain access to employment and assistance
in migrating, substantially reducing the costs and risks of movement to them. This increases the
attractiveness and feasibility of migration for additional members, allowing them to migrate and
expanding further the set of people with network connections. Migration networks can then be
viewed as reducing the cost of migration c, and perhaps also increasing the beneﬁts w.R e d u c i n g
the costs of migration has two eects on the desired level of household migration. Firstly, for a
10given unconstrained level of desired migration, a reduction in migration costs makes it less likely
that subsistence concerns will prevent migration from reaching this desired level. This eect tends
to reduce A1, the asset level at which households are no longer constrained. However, a reduction
in migration costs also increases the net beneﬁts of migrating, w  c, making households want to
migrate more, and thereby increasing their likelihood of being constrained. This eect therefore
tends to increase A1. One can show that which eect dominates depends on whether migration
costs are high to begin with, in which case the second eect dominates, or low to begin with, in
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Figure 2 plots the eect of a reduction in migration costs for initial situations of high and low
costs. In both cases we see that networks, by lowering migration costs, increase desired household
migration rates at any asset level at which there was initially some migration, and also induce
additional individuals to migrate. Interestingly, these additional migrant households are households
who were initially too wealthy to bother with migration given its costs, but who now ﬁnd the net
beneﬁts of migration to have increased as a result of the network to a point where it is now worth
migrating.
    
m
* LOW COSTS 
A
m
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A
Figure 2: Eect of a Reduction in Migration Costs on Optimal Household Migration Rate According
to Initial Level of Costs. Solid Lines are at original costs, Dotted Lines at the new lower costs.
11As we are considering only one period for the migration decision, this rules out the possibility of
strategic delay, whereby migrants delay migrating in the current period in order to wait for networks
to lower the costs of migrating in the next. Even without such a factor, Carrington, Detragiache and
Vishwanath (1996) note that once networks make migration costs endogenous, there is the possibility
of multiple equilibria, since individual households do not internalize the cost-lowering impact of their
own migration on the migration decisions of others. In these circumstances, initial conditions become
important, and a village which has high initial levels of migration for some exogenous reason will
continue to have higher levels of migration in subsequent periods. We will use this idea to argue
that historic migration rates provide instruments for current migration levels in the communities in
our study.
In the context of this model, it becomes clear that the relationship between migration and
subsequent inequality will depend on the initial distribution of income. In light of the observations
of sociologists, such as Massey, Goldring and Durand (1994), it seems likely that initially it will be
the middle class of a village who have the highest rates of migration, and so we can interpret the
level of wealth A1, at which the initial turning point occurs, as being middle class. Their migration
is then likely to increase village inequality. When migration costs are high to begin with, the ﬁrst
network eects tend to reinforce this, by increasing migration opportunities more for the middle
and upper-middle classes, as is seen in the High Cost scenario in Figure 2. Migration will therefore
increase inequality at ﬁrst. However, as migration costs continue to fall through the building of
a larger network, we see from the Low Cost scenario that further reductions in migration costs
will beneﬁt primarily the lower and lower-middle classes in the village, which will tend to reduce
inequality.7 This gives rise to an inverted U-shaped relation between migration and inequality which
i st h eh y p o t h e s i st ob et e s t e di nt h i sp a p e r .
7The migrant network may also provide loans to potential migrants, which information costs prevent other potential
lenders from making. The result is that even households with wealth below A may eventually be able to migrate,
further lowering inequality.
123D a t a
Mexico has some of the most comprehensive surveys of migration available for any developing coun-
try. In order to examine the eect of migration on inequality in the sending communities, one would
ideally like to have individual and community-level panel data on both assets and migration. While
no single survey ﬁts this criterion, we use two surveys which approach it: the Mexican Migration
Project (MMP) data and the Encuesta Nacional de Dinámica Demográﬁca (ENADID), along with
the national income and expenditure survey (Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares
-E N I G H ) .
The majority of our analysis uses data from the Mexican Migration Project, a collaborative
research project based at the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Guadalajara.8 The
MMP surveyed ﬁve communities in 1982, between two and ﬁve communities each year from 1987-97,
and fourteen communities in 1998. In general, 200 households were surveyed in each community,
with smaller samples taken in communities with less than 500 residents. We use the MMP71 data-
base, which contains data on 71 communities. Since our theoretical model applies best to rural
communities and small towns, we restrict most of our analysis to the 57 communities which had a
population below 100,000 in 1990. Each community is surveyed only once, but household heads are
asked entire life retrospective migration histories, including whether at each point in time they had
a parent or sibling with U.S. migrant experience.9 In addition, the survey asks for each individual
in the household whether they have ever been to the United States, and if so, in what year was
their ﬁrst migrant experience. This enables the construction of a time-series of the stock of current
residents in a community who had migrant experience in a given year. In addition to questions
about migration, households are asked about their current and past land holdings, and about cur-
rent household infrastructure and durable asset ownership. No information is collected on household
income or consumption in Mexico. The dataset also contains community-level variables taken from
8Full details of the methodology, the data, and the questionnaires are available at
http://www.pop.upenn.edu/mexmig.
9Later years of the survey also ask this information for spouses of the head, but since this data is not available for
all communities, we do not use it in our analysis.
13past years of the Mexican Census. The survey is typically taken in December and January, which
is when traditionally most migrants return to their communities, but if initial ﬁeldwork suggests
migrants tend to return during other months instead, a portion of the interviews are conducted
then.10
The MMP surveys have the advantage of containing the most detailed migration data, allow-
ing construction of both community and household head panel data on migration and migration
networks. However, since data on assets are collected only for the survey year, we only have cross-
sectional data on inequality for each community. Moreover, although migration history itself is not
an explicit criteria in selection of communities, the survey contains data from only 13 of Mexico’s 32
states, with many of the surveyed communities coming from the traditional migrant-sending states
in West-Central Mexico. For these reasons we also carry out some estimation using data from the
ENADID11.
The ENADID is a national demographic survey intended to provide information on fertility,
infant and general mortality, national and international migration, births, deaths and contraceptive
practices. It was taken in 1992 and again in 1997 by Mexico’s national statistical agency, the Instituto
Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI).12 The questionnaires and summary tables
for 1992 are contained in INEGI (1994). Approximately 2000 households were surveyed in each state,
with a total sample size of 57,017 households in 1992 and 73,412 households in 1997. The ENADID
asks whether household members have ever been to the U.S. in search of work. This question is
asked of all household members who normally live in the household, even if they are temporarily
studying or working elsewhere, and an additional question asks whether any household members
have gone to live in another country in the past ﬁve years. Thus U.S. migrants are recorded as long
as they return to Mexico or have family members remaining in the community. Although the same
households were not sampled in both years, some of the same municipalities were. Restricting our
focus to municipalities with less than 100,000 population, we were able to match 97 municipalities
10A small non-random sample of 10-20 households from each community is also conducted in the U.S., however we
do not use this data.
11See Massey and Zenteno (2000) for a comparison of the MMP with the ENADID 1992 survey.
12Unfortunately this survey was not continued after 1997, preventing us from using a longer community panel.
14in which 50 or more households were surveyed in both 1992 and 1997, although in only 33 of these
were 100 or more households surveyed in both years. As with the MMP data, the ENADID surveys
collect some information on household infrastructure, but no data on consumption and only the
1997 survey contains income data. In the next Section we describe the method used to calculate
inequality based on such data. For the municipalities which are surveyed in both 1992 and 1997, we
then have a short panel on inequality and migration at the community level.
The MMP survey collects migration information for all children of the household, whether or
not they live at home. In addition, since the surveys are collected during the traditional migrant
return period, data are collected on community members who are only present for part of the
year in Mexico. Households for which all community members have permanently migrated to the
United States are not captured. We therefore study the impact of migration of community members
who have returned to the community, or who have parents still in the community, on inequality
among households present in the community at the time of the survey. Since Mexican migration is
characterized by frequent return, with the median trip duration in the MMP and ENADID being
seven months (Massey and Zenteno, 2000), this still enables us to capture much of a community’s
migration experience.
A large component of the ﬁx e dc o s to fm i g r a t i o ni no u rt h e o r e t i c a lm o d e lc a nb ev i e w e da st h e
cost of crossing the border. Most of the recent ﬁrst-time migrants in the MMP sample crossed
illegally: on average 89 percent of ﬁrst-time migrants between 1970 and 1990 were undocumented,
while a further 7 percent entered on tourist visas. Figure 3 shows that this is in sharp contrast to
the period before 1965, where less than one-quarter were undocumented, and the majority entered
under the bracero program, which allowed for the temporary recruitment of Mexican farmworkers.
In 1965 the United States Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act, ending the
bracero program.13 From this point onwards, the overwhelming majority of ﬁrst-time migrants in
the MMP sample are undocumented.
More detailed description of the asset variables contained in the MMP and ENADID surveys and
13See Chapter 3 of Massey, Durand and Malone (2002) for a summary of the bracero era and description of the
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Figure 3: Legal Status of First-time Migrants in the MMP Sample.
the method used to construct inequality measures from them is contained in the next Section and in
Appendix 2, while precise deﬁnitions of the migration variables are deferred to Section 6. Appendix
1 describes the source and construction of variables not contained directly in these data sets. Table
1 provides summary statistics for both the MMP and ENADID surveys for key variables used in
this paper. As expected, the MMP sample consists of communities with higher average levels of
migration than the ENADID sample: on average 26 percent of individuals aged 15 and over in the
MMP communities had been to the U.S., compared to 9 percent in the ENADID municipalities.
4 Construction of Consumption and Inequality Measures
The MMP data and the ENADID data provide the most comprehensive information about Mexican
migration. However, unfortunately neither survey contains information on consumption, while only
the ENADID 1997 survey has income data. The surveys do contain a variety of information on
household infrastructure, such as whether the house has a dirt or tile ﬂoor and whether the household
has access to running water, electricity and sewerage facilities. The MMP survey also asks whether
households own certain durable assets, such as a car, radio, television, stove and fridge. In a
companion paper, McKenzie (2003) uses the ENIGH surveys from Mexico, which contain data on
16both asset indicators and consumption and income, to show how such asset indicators can be used to
also obtain proxies for inequalities in living standards. We brieﬂy summarize this approach here and
its use in constructing measures of inequality for the MMP and ENADID surveyed communities.
Given a vector x =( x1,...,xP)
0 of asset indicators, most of which are dummy variables for types
of infrastructure or ownership of certain durables, the ﬁrst principal component of the observations,

















whose sample variance is greatest amongst all such linear combinations, subject to the restriction
a0a =1 ,w h e r exk and sk are the sample mean and standard deviation of variable xk.A s s e t s
which vary most across households are given larger weight, which is a useful feature of this approach
for measuring inequality. Since the mean of y across all households is zero, inequality measures
which divide by the mean are ill-deﬁned. Instead, McKenzie (2003) proposes a relative measure
of inequality across communities. Letting c be the standard deviation of y across households in






Ic can be shown to satisfy many of the commonly accepted desired properties of an inequality
measure, and can be thought of as a proxy for relative inequality in wealth.
The ENIGH surveys contain data on income, consumption, and many of the same asset indi-
cators as are in the migration surveys. Using these auxiliary surveys, one can predict income and
consumption given the asset indicators found in the MMP and ENADID surveys, and then using the
residuals from this prediction in a bootstrapping process, obtain estimates of the Gini coe!cients
for income and consumption for each migration survey. Appendix 2 details the process used and
provides the principal components used in constructing Ic.
175 Determinants of Migration
The theoretical model presented in Section 2 predicts that migration rates will display a non-linear
relationship with wealth. Since our analysis of the eect of migration on inequality is predicated
on such a relationship between migration and household resources, we ﬁrst examine the empirical
support for such a model. Massey and Espinosa (1997) study a large number of determinants of
the migration decision, and ﬁnd social capital in the form of migrant parents, siblings, and other
community members to play the most powerful role. However, they include only dummy variables
for land, home, and business ownership, and thus do not examine the role of nonlinearities in wealth.
Using the MMP data for municipalities with less than 100,000 population in 1990, we estimate
a probit model for the probability of a household head in Mexico migrating to the United States at
some stage in the year of or the year prior to the survey year as a quadratic function of household
resources. Four dierent measures of household resources are used: actual land holdings, the asset
index based on the ﬁrst principal component, and predicted monetary non-durable consumption and
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Figure 4: Probability of the household head ﬁrst migrating to the U.S. within 2 years of the survey
year as a function of wealth: Male heads aged 20-39. Vertical lines indicate 10th, 50th, and 90th
percentiles of the wealth distribution.
Figure 4 shows that the empirical relationship between migration rates and household resources
18is indeed ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing in total resources. The highest migration rate is found
at levels of resources at or around the median wealth level for households with heads aged 20-39.
This complements the ﬁnding of Chiquiar and Hanson (2002) that Mexican immigrants tend to
come from the upper-middle of the education distribution in Mexico and provides support for the
quadratic relationship between migration and wealth predicted by our theory.
Table 2 examines further the determinants of the migration decision of the household head,
and the role of personal and community migration networks in this decision. We use predicted log
non-durable consumption (lndc) as our preferred measure of household resources. We begin with
a cross-sectional analysis, estimating a probit model of the probability that a male household head
aged 15-49 years ﬁrst made a trip to the United States within a year of the survey year. Since only
current wealth information is available, which is likely to reﬂect in part the result of past migration,
we focus only on ﬁrst-time migrants around the time of the survey.
Column 1 replicates the unconditional quadratic relationship between migration rates and lndc.
Column 2 ﬁnds that this relationship continues to hold after controlling for the age, marital and
parental status of the household head, and for various community characteristics which might be
thought to aect access to credit, access to information about migration opportunities, and the
cost of migrating, such as availability of lenders, whether there is a train station in the community,
distance to the nearest highway and distance to the principal migrant destination for community
in the U.S. None of these community characteristics is found to play a signiﬁcant role. Column 3
then introduces the U.S. migration rate over 1955-59, the middle of the bracero period, for the state
in which each community is located, taken from González Navarro (1974).14 This historic state-
level migration rate is found to have a strongly signiﬁcant positive eect on an individual head’s
probability of migration.
Column 4 of Table 3 then adds measures of the migration experience of the immediate family and
community of the head. The community network is found to matter, with the proportion of other
households with migrant experience two years prior to the survey year having a signiﬁcant positive
14Thanks to Chris Woodru for generously supplying this data.
19eect. Having a father or brother with previous migrant experience also has a signiﬁcant eect at
the 10 percent level of signiﬁcance. This eect is conditional on wealth, and thus does not simply
reﬂect greater wealth accumulation by migrant family members. However, it may reﬂect unobserved
family factors which inﬂuence migration, such as greater English skills or ability to cross borders,
rather than network eects. In Column 5 we see that these eects continue to hold when we add a
cubic term in lndc, whereas the cubic term is not signiﬁcant. Higher order terms in lndc also proved
insigniﬁcant, with the estimated function appearing quadratic in all instances.
The community characteristics included aim to capture dierences amongst communities which
could aect migration. However, there may still be unobserved community characteristics which
aect the probability that all individuals in a community migrate. The personal and community
migrant network variables could then be capturing the inﬂuence of these unobservable characteristics,
rather than the role of networks. We therefore use the retrospective panel of migration history for
the head and in Column 6 of Table 3 include community ﬁxed eects to capture time-invariant
community characteristics. Since we only have lndc for the end period, we use education as our
proxy for wealth, and ﬁnd a quadratic relationship again. After controlling for community ﬁxed
eects, we still ﬁnd strong positive eects of both the community migrant network and having a
migrant brother or father for the probability of migrating.
The migration decision is also aected by the beneﬁts of migrating to the U.S. Prime determi-
nants of these beneﬁts are the wage gap between Mexico and the United States, and the probability
of ﬁnding employment in the U.S. Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999) ﬁnd a negative relation between
Mexican real wages and border apprehensions, a weaker positive eect of U.S. wages on apprehen-
sions, but no signiﬁcant eect of U.S. unemployment on border apprehensions. We deﬁne the wage
gap as the dierence between the real U.S. hourly manufacturing wage expressed in terms of pesos
and the real hourly Mexican manufacturing wage15. We then regress the percentage change in the
wage gap between years t and t +1on the real depreciation over the year, using annual data for
the period 1969-1998. The R2 for this regression is 0.959, with a coe!cient of 2.10 on the real
15Wage data kindly provided by Gordon Hanson.
20depreciation. Movements in the Mexico-U.S. real exchange rate therefore appear to be the major
source of movements in relative wages between the two countries. Since real exchange rate data are
available over a longer period than real wages, we use the real depreciation as our main measure of
relative wage changes.
Column 7 of Table 3 adds these time-varying aggregate variables, and ﬁnds a signiﬁcant negative
eect of the real depreciation rate on the probability of migration. This negative eect of a devalu-
ation is also found by Massey and Espinosa (1997) who note that while a real depreciation increases
the wage gap between Mexico and the United States, it also raises the cost of being smuggled into
the U.S., which is usually expressed in terms of dollars. The negative eect suggests that the eect
of the real depreciation on costs dominates its eect on the beneﬁts, and that credit constraints do
matter. From equation 2 we see that since a depreciation will increase w  c, it will increase the
probability of migration for unconstrained households, whereas the increase in c tends to counteract
this for constrained households. To investigate this hypothesis further, in Column 8 we interact the
real depreciation with the head’s education, our proxy for wealth. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive
interaction term, which indicates that households with more resources are less aected by an increase
in the cost of migration, in accordance with our theory.
6 Inequality and Migration
6.1 Direct and Indirect eects of migration on inequality
The most direct eect of migration is to increase the welfare of the migrant households, as migrants
bring back remittances and savings from abroad. This can either increase or decrease inequality
in the community, depending on where the migrant household is located in the overall community
wealth distribution. However, in addition to these eects on the migrant’s own household, it has
been argued that there can be spillover beneﬁts for the community at large. One such eect is
through the multiplier role of remittances. Durand, Parrado and Massey (1996) report that the
majority of U.S. earnings are spent on current consumption, including family maintenance, health,
21home construction and the purchase of consumer goods. Such spending increases the demand for
goods and services produced by other community members. Adelman, Taylor and Vogel (1988) use
a Social Accounting Matrix to estimate that a $100 drop in remittances results in a $178 drop in
village income, for one village in Michoacán. Remittances also help foster production, with Woodru
and Zenteno (2001) ﬁnding a strong eect of remittances on investment in microenterprises. In the
context of our theoretical model, these spillover eects may be seen as raising the income or wealth
levels of non-migrant members of the community, allowing some households to move above the
threshold level A at which households are constrained by subsistence to not migrate.
The community can also beneﬁt further from migration through the formation of networks, which
lower the costs and increase the potential beneﬁts to other community members from migrating.
Table 3 uses data from the Mexican Migration Project to present supportive evidence of this. We
divide communities into those above the median migration prevalence rate and to those below. The
top panel looks at how the costs of migration vary with the level of community migration prevalence.
As was seen in Figure 3, the majority of ﬁrst-time migrants cross without documents. The proportion
of recent ﬁrst-time migrants crossing without documents does not vary between communities of low
and high migration prevalence. Most recent ﬁrst-time illegal crossings employ a coyote (border-
smuggler), and we ﬁnd some evidence that the mean cost of this coyote is lower in communities
with larger migration networks. Moreover, Massey, Durand and Malone (2002) report that with an
increase in coyote fees in the 1990s following increased border enforcement, migrants increasingly
relied on friends or family already in the United States to arrange and ﬁnance the coyote. Clearly
a larger migrant network increases this possibility. In terms of other migration costs, Durand et al.
(1996) report that migradollars have played a large role in promoting transportation to the border.
Table 3 shows most new migrants stay with friends, family, or other community members upon
arrival, and about 40 percent cross with friends. Conditional on migrating, these features of the
migration do not vary with size of the migrant network, but clearly a larger network increases the
number of community members who can provide such assistance.
The bottom panel of Table 3 looks at the role of networks in helping migrants obtain jobs in the
22United States. Migrants from communities where more other community members have migrated
are signiﬁcantly more likely to have obtained their last U.S. job through the recommendation of a
relative, friend, or fellow community member, rather than through their own search or contracting.
Even in communities with lower levels of overall prevalence, household heads who actually migrate
still rely heavily on relatives or friends to recommend them for a job, however with low prevalence,
less people will know relatives or friends in the U.S. who can help them in this way. Moreover,
Munshi (2003) ﬁnds that individuals with larger networks are not only more likely to be employed,
but are also more likely to hold a higher paying nonagricultural job in the U.S.
Additionally, migration can have general equilibrium eects which aect other community mem-
bers. Mishra (2003) ﬁnds that Mexican migration to the U.S. has a signiﬁcant positive impact of
the wages of other workers in Mexico. However, these eects are estimated to be greatest for higher
wage workers, and therefore increase wage inequality in Mexico. However, Hanson, Robertson and
Spilimbergo (2002) ﬁnd a weaker eect of border enforcement on wages in Mexican border cities,
with the eect greatest for low-education workers. The overall eect of migration on inequality,
which we attempt to measure in the next Section, is therefore the net result of these direct eects,
multiplier eects, network eects, and general equilibrium eects.
6.2 OLS Results
The prediction of our theoretical model is that, conditional on other community characteristics,
inequality should ﬁrst increase and then decrease with the level of community migration experience.
To avoid issues of simultaneity, we therefore model current inequality for community i in survey
year t, Ineqi,t, as a quadratic function of previous migration, migi,ts, and a vector of other current
community characteristics, Xi,t:
Ineqi,t =  + 1migi,ts + 2mig2
i,ts + 0Xi,t + %i,t (15)
Our main measure of migration is the community migration prevalence ratio 15 years before the
survey period. The migration prevalence ratio is deﬁned as in Massey, Goldring and Durand (1994)
23to be the number of people in a given community aged 15 years or older with international migratory
experience in a given year divided by the total number of people in the community aged 15 or
older alive in the reference year. They argue that such an indicator provides a good proxy for the
extent of a given community’s involvement in the transnational migratory process. Moreover, in the
present context, the prevalence ratio serves as a measure of the stock of migration experience in the
community, which is expected to impact on inequality through both the direct and indirect channels
mentioned above. For robustness, we will later consider a second measure of migration experience,
which is the proportion of current households which had a migrant 15 years before. Since we are
concerned that there may be factors which contemporaneously aect both migration and inequality,
such as temporary shocks at the community level, we look at migration experience 15 years prior to
the survey period, although later consider also periods of 5, 10 and 20 years before for robustness
purposes. Since the MMP survey asks all individuals the year of their ﬁrst trip to the U.S., these
measures of migration prevalence can be easily calculated at any point in time. In contrast, the
ENADID survey only asks as of the survey date whether individuals have ever been to the U.S. and
the year of the last trip, which means that one can not calculate historic migration prevalence rates
for the ENADID communities.
Three separate measures of inequality are considered: the predicted Gini of non-durable con-
sumption obtained via the method outlined in Section 4, the predicted Gini of income obtained via
the same method, and the relative inequality in assets measure, Ic, given in equation 14. The MMP71
dataset then contains information on 57 communities with 1990 populations below 100,000. Given
this relatively small sample size, we choose a parsimonious speciﬁcation of the other community
characteristics Xi,t, including the proportion of household heads aged under 30 in the survey year,
the proportion of household heads aged over 60, the proportion of household heads with less than
six years of education, and the proportion of household heads with nine or more years of education.
Table 4 then presents the OLS estimates of equation 15. We present speciﬁcations which include
only a linear term in past migration experience, as well as those which also contain a quadratic term,
and speciﬁcations both with and without the community characteristics as additional regressors.
24With all three measures of inequality, the overall ﬁt is poor when the demographic controls are
not included, and one does not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant relationship between past migration
stock and current inequality. Including the demographic controls improves the ﬁt somewhat, and
there is a signiﬁcant negative relationship between migration prevalence and inequality in assets,
and inequality in income. The coe!cient on migration prevalence is negative, but insigniﬁcant, in
the equation for inequality in non-durable consumption.
6.3 IV Results
The OLS regressions contain only limited controls for community characteristics, and so a concern is
that there are unobserved community characteristics which are correlated with both past migration
prevalence and current inequality. Possible examples would include employment opportunities within
the community, access to credit, and land ownership patterns. While we have proxies for some of
these characteristics, such as data on the number of banks in the community, such proxies are likely
to be imperfect. Furthermore, with only 57 communities, the model would soon become saturated
should we attempt to control for all community characteristics which are plausibly related to both
migration and inequality. Therefore we instead pursue an instrumental variables strategy to account
for a possible omitted variables bias due to correlation between migi,ts and %i,t.
We consider several possible instruments for the migration prevalence in a community. Woodru
and Zenteno (2001) argue that historic state-level migration ﬂows can be used as instruments for
current migration in estimating the eect of migration remittances on microenterprise capital. Fol-
lowing them, we use the U.S. migration rate for 1924 for the state in which each community is
located, taken from Foerster (1925). These state-level historic migration rates may be argued to
be a result of largely historic demand-side factors coupled with the arrival of railroads into Mexico.
Massey, Durand, and Malone (2002) outline how restrictions on immigration from Asia coupled
with a booming economy in the Southwest of the United States lead US employers to hire “engan-
chadores” (contractors) to obtain as many workers as possible. These enganchadores followed the
railroads south into Mexico, stopping in the ﬁrst sizeable population centers they encountered to
25hire workers, which were in the west-central Mexican states. The arrival and lay-out of the railroad
system thereby led to some states having dierent migration rates than others. This historic migra-
tion at the state level led to the development of migration networks, which we expect to determine
the community-level migration prevalence, migi,ts, but not otherwise aect inequality within the
community. Massey, Goldring and Durand (1994, p 1496) lead credence to this assumption, arguing
that “transnational migration tends to become a self-reinforcing process that...over time...becomes
increasingly independent of the conditions that originally caused it”.16
In addition to the 1924 state migration rates, Woodru and Zenteno also use migration rates
over the 1955-59 period by state, taken from González Navarro (1974).17 These rates are from the
peak period of the 1942-64 bracero program. This program allowed for the legal entry of temporary
farm workers, providing up to 450,000 work visas annually to Mexicans during the peak years, and
allowed for the immigration of around 5 million Mexicans into the United States (Massey, Durand
and Malone (2002)). The sharp break in U.S. immigration policy in 1965 ended this program, and
as seen in Figure 3, undocumented migration came to greatly outnumber legal migration in the
subsequent period. State-level migration rates during this bracero period are expected to contribute
to community prevalence rates, both directly through some community members participating in
the bracero program, and through the development of migrant networks. However, they are not
expected to have an additional impact on current community levels of inequality, especially given
the period of thirty to forty years which have passed since the peak years of the bracero period.
A second set of instruments consists of demand-side variables from the United States, which aect
the costs and beneﬁts of migrating, but have no other direct impact on rural Mexican communities.
For each MMP community, one can identify the most common US city destination for migrants
from a given community on their ﬁrst trip to the U.S. Dierences in geographic proximity and
historic migration patterns will mean that dierent communities will tend to cluster at dierent US
destinations. The unemployment rate in the US state in which this destination city is located will
16Escobar Latapí et al. (1998, p 164) also conclude that “the origins of Mexico-U.S. migration lie largely inside the
United States”.
17Data kindly supplied by Chris Woodru.
26then aect migration from that community to the US. Since we need to instrument migration stocks
rather than ﬂows, we aggregate up unemployment in each of the ten years prior to the year in which
migration prevalence is measured, and weight by the proportion of current household heads who
were of prime migrant age, 20-30 years, in that year. For example, for community 1 surveyed in
1987, for which the most common U.S. destination is Los Angeles, the weighted unemployment rate
is then calculated as the 1971 Californian unemployment rate (cue71) multiplied by the proportion
of heads in that community aged 20-30 years in 1971 (f71)+cue70f70+...+cue62f62. This weighted
unemployment over 1962-71 is then used to instrument migration prevalence in community 1 in
1972. Similarly, we also use the real depreciation of the peso against the U.S. dollar, weighted by
prime age population in each of the ﬁfteen years prior to the year at which migration prevalence is
measured as an instrument. Dierent communities are surveyed in dierent years, and have dierent
cohort sizes of prime migration age in the years in which large depreciations are realized, resulting in
dierences in the eective depreciation faced by our dierent communities. Finally, we also consider
the distance from the community to the prime U.S. destination, and this distance squared as possible
instruments for migration prevalence.
Table 5 then presents the ﬁrst-stage instrumental variables regression results when various com-
binations of these instruments are used to instrument migration prevalence and migration prevalence
squared. Results are presented both for the cases with and without community demographic char-
acteristics included as exogenous regressors in the second-stage. Three main instrument sets are
used. Set A is arguably the most exogenous, consisting of the 1924 state level migration rate, and
the US state unemployment rate and weighted real depreciation. Instrument Set B consists of solely
the 1955-59 rate, which has the single greatest predictive power, and is therefore least subject to
weak instrument concerns, while Instrument Set C consists of the full set of possible instruments.
Both the 1924 and 1955-59 state migration rates are found to be signiﬁcant, when included sepa-
rately, with the 1955-59 rate maintaining signiﬁcance when both sets are included. Weighted state
unemployment generally has the expected negative sign, but is insigniﬁcant. The weighted real
depreciation has a negative coe!cient, which is signiﬁcant in some speciﬁcations. As in estimation
27of the individual household head’s migration decision, it therefore appears that a real depreciation
reduces migration, possibly through an increase in the cost of migrating. Migration prevalence at
ﬁrst increases and then decreases with distance, which we attribute to picking up the fact that most
migration still comes from west-central Mexico. The p-values for the F-statistic of the excluded
instruments are all less than 0.01 for the prediction of community migration prevalence, while the
F-statistics themselves are around 5 for instrument sets A and C, and over 30 for instrument set
B. Migration prevalence squared is predicted somewhat less strongly than the level of migration
prevalence, but the F-statistics still show instrument relevance.
The second-stage IV results using the Gini of non-durable consumption as our inequality measure
are given in Table 6. Table 7 provides results using relative asset inequality, while Table 8 gives the
results using the income Gini. In each table, columns (1)-(3) present results for a linear speciﬁcation
in migration prevalence with no additional regressors, columns (4)-(6) add community demographic
characteristics, and columns (7)-(12) add a quadratic term in migration prevalence to columns
(1)-(6). Comparing the IV estimates to the OLS estimates in Table 4, we ﬁnd the coe!cients in
columns (4)-(6) of Tables 6-8 to be more negative, and of greater signiﬁcance, than the corresponding
OLS regressions in columns (3), (7) and (11) of Table 4. After instrumenting and controlling
for community characteristics, migration prevalence has a signiﬁcant negative eect on community
inequality. This eect is strongest and most signiﬁcant for asset inequality, where the coe!cients in
columns (5) and (6) of Table 7 translate an increase in past migration prevalence of 0.14, representing
the interquartile range of migration prevalence, into a -0.17 reduction in the asset inequality index.
This represents a 20 percent reduction at the mean relative asset inequality index, and would take
a community at the 75th percentile of asset inequality down almost to the 25th percentile. The
same magnitude increase in migration prevalence is predicted to reduce the income Gini by 0.022 to
0.025, and the non-durable consumption Gini by 0.015 to 0.018. At the mean this translates into a
4.4 percent fall in the Gini of NDC and a 5.6 percent fall in the income Gini, taking a community
at the 75th percentile of inequality down to the median, so these eects of migration are lower for
income and consumption inequality than for asset inequality. For both instrument sets A and C,
28the overidentiﬁcation test p-values are larger than 0.12 for all the speciﬁcations which are linear in
migration prevalence, so we cannot reject that our instruments are valid.
Adding a quadratic term in migration prevalence to the instrument variables regression results
in insigniﬁcant coe!cients on most of the quadratic terms, which accords with the OLS results.
T h es i g n so ft h ec o e !cients in columns (7)-(9) of Tables 6 and 7 are in accordance with our theo-
retical prediction, with inequality ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing with migration, however the
coe!cients are not signiﬁcant. Once we include community characteristics, both the linear and
quadratic terms in migration prevalence are negative in the equations for non-durable consumption
and income. That is, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant evidence for nonlinearity in the inequality and migration
relationship using the MMP data.
The results thusfar indicate a signiﬁcant negative relationship between migration prevalence
ratios 15 years before the survey and current inequality. Table 9 examines the robustness of this
relationship to alternative time lags, looking at the instrumented migration prevalence in the current
period and 5, 10, and 20 years before the survey period. Since inequality is measured between
households, the proportion of households with a migrant member may also be a more appropriate
measure of community levels of migration, and so we also consider this proportion in the current
period and 5, 10, and 15 years before the survey period. We continue to ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative
relationship between inequality and past migration, for all three measures of inequality and each
of these alternative measures of past community migration experience. Our ﬁndings are therefore
robust to alternative measures of timing.
6.4 Quantile Regression Results
An alternative approach towards examining the distributional eects of migration is to employ
quantile regression analysis.18 Consider the following quantile regression equation for wealth, wi,
measured as log of non-durable consumption or income, or the asset index, as a function of the
migration stock in household i’s community, migi, and other determinants of wealth such as age
18See Koenker and Hallock (2001) for a recent overview.
29and education, denoted Xi:
wi = q + qmigi + 0
qXi + %i (16)
Here q denotes the qth conditional quantile of wealth. The parameter q measures how wealth
responds to migration stock at quantile q. If migration increases inequality, we would expect to see
increasing dispersion of wealth with migration status, and so ﬁnd larger q’s for the upper quantiles.
In contrast, if migration reduces inequality, we should ﬁnd larger q’s at lower quantiles. Table
10 presents the results from quantile regression estimation of equation 16. The results show that
migration reduces dispersion in consumption, assets, and income, since these wealth measures grow
faster with migration for the lower quantiles. This conﬁrms the ﬁnding of the IV analysis that
migration reduces inequality in the MMP sample.19
6.5 ENADID Results : Does a Change in Inequality result from a Change
in Migration?
Using the MMP data we ﬁnd that an increase in migration prevalence is followed by a reduction
in inequality, but no evidence for increases in inequality at lower levels of migration prevalence. As
mentioned previously, the MMP communities are mostly from states with historically high levels
of migration, and it may be that most of the MMP communities are therefore past the level of
migration at which a turning point occurs. For this reason, we use the ENADID surveys, which are
nationally representative and cover a wider range of migration experiences. We are able to match
some of the same municipalities in the 1992 and 1997 ENADID surveys, and then examine changes
in inequality over a period in the 1990s in which substantial migration to the U.S. from Mexico was
occurring. We consider two speciﬁcations which allow for a nonlinear eect of migration changes on
inequality. The ﬁrst is to run the following regression across municipalities k:
19A quadratic term in migration did not prove signiﬁcant for any of the three measures of wealth status. There was
therefore no evidence of a region of increasing inequality at lower levels of migration.
30Ineqk = 0 + 1migk + 2migk  migk,1992 + uk (17)
where Ineqk denotes the change in inequality in municipality k between 1992 and 1997, migk is
the change in migration prevalence over this same period, and migk,1992 is the 1992 level of migration
prevalence. If an increase in migration always results in a reduction in inequality, then we would
expect 1 < 0. The interaction term allows for the eect of the change in migration to vary according
to the initial level. If the theory is correct and there is in fact an inverse U-shape, then one would
expect to ﬁnd 1 > 0 and 2 < 0, that is, an increase in migration would increase inequality at low
initial levels of migration stock, and would reduce inequality at higher levels. The constant term
captures any aggregate change in within-municipality inequality occurring in Mexico between 1992
and 1997.
The second speciﬁcation directly takes dierences of equation (15):






The theory then predicts 1 > 0 and 2 < 0. Since these equations are expressed in terms of
dierences, municipality ﬁxed characteristics which are correlated with both inequality and migration
levels are dierenced out. This greatly reduces the need for instrumenting, and we estimate equations
17 and 18 using OLS. We are unable to employ the instrumental variables approach used for the
MMP data, since distances to the border and historic migration rates are ﬁxed over time, while
changes in U.S. labour market conditions prove to be weak instruments for explaining variation
across communities in migration rates over this period.
One concern is that since we observe a dierent sample of individuals from a given municipality
in 1997 than we did in 1992, some of the changes in inequality and migration prevalence found in
the data may just be the result of small-sample measurement-error bias. With su!cient individuals
sampled from a municipality, this is less of a concern. Verbeek and Nijman (1992) ﬁnd that with
sample sizes of 100-200 households, pseudo-panel data provides a good approximation to genuine
31panel data. We therefore carry out our analysis using the 33 municipalities which had a sample size
of 100 or more households in both ENADID surveys.
Table 11 presents the results from the ENADID data. Under equation 17, column 1 shows no
signiﬁcant relationship when the interaction term is not included, and column 2 shows a signiﬁcant
inverse-U relationship once the interaction term is included. The Gini of non-durable consumption
increases with an increase in migration up to an initial migration prevalence ratio of 0.17, after which
it decreases. The turning point lies within the observed sample range, at around the 85th percentile
of 1992 migration prevalence in the ENADID survey, but only at the 34th percentile of current
migration prevalence in the MMP surveys. In columns 3 we see this inverse U-shape relationship is
robust to the use of an alternative measure of migration stock. Using the speciﬁcation in equation
18, column 4 ﬁnds coe!cients of the signs predicted by an inverse-U theory, and a turning point
similar to that in column 2. However, the coe!cients are only signiﬁcant at the 14% level. When we
use the Ic measure of relative inequality, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eect using the migration prevalence
ratio, and a very weak eect using the proportion of households with a migrant. This may be a
result of the clumping and truncation in the principal component index (see Figure 5 in Appendix
2), which means that asset inequality is likely to be measured less well than consumption inequality
in the ENADID data. Columns 8-10 ﬁnd some evidence of an inverse U-shaped relationship for
income, but not as strong as for non-durable consumption.
The evidence for an inverse U-shape should be viewed as suggestive only, since the relationship
is not signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations, and is stronger for non-durable consumption than for asset or
income inequality. However, the signs in all regressions in columns 2-10 of Table 11 all point towards
an inverse-U shape, and we obtain similar turning points under the speciﬁcations in both equations
17 and 18. Given that 5 years is a relatively short time to observe changes in inequality, and that we
only have data for 33 municipalities, we view this evidence as providing reasonably strong support
for our theory.
The nature of the data means that we can not employ instrumental variables here, and so only
claim an association between changes in migration and changes in inequality. Although there may
32be unobserved time-varying community characteristics which eect both changes in migration and
changes in inequality, it is di!cult to think of a priori reasons why they should result in the inverse
U-shaped inequality-migration relationship found here. The results can be squared with the ﬁndings
of the MMP data, in which migration resulted in a decrease in inequality, by noting that the majority
of the MMP communities have migration prevalence higher than the turning point predicted in the
ENADID data, so that one observes only the second part of the inverse-U in the MMP data.20
7C o n c l u s i o n s
Migrants to the United States from Mexico are found to come from the middle of the asset wealth
distribution, with the probability of migration displaying an inverse-U shaped relationship with
wealth. The presence of migration networks, both at the family and at the community level, are
found to increase the likelihood of migration, which accords with their ability to raise the expected
beneﬁts and lower the costs of migration. At high levels of migration prevalence, such as occur in
many of the MMP communities, we ﬁnd that this migration leads to a reduction in inequality. Large
networks spread the beneﬁts of migration to members at the lower end of the income and wealth
distributions of the community, reducing inequality. Asset inequality is found to decline more than
consumption or income inequality. We ﬁnd suggestive evidence for a Kuznet’s relationship using
data from the ENADID, with migration increasing inequality at lower levels of migration stock, and
then reducing inequality as one approaches the migration levels prevailing in the MMP communities.
Panel data on inequality over longer time periods, and for more communities, is needed to conﬁrm
this evidence.
20Note that the dierences in migration prevalence across the two surveys are not due to dierences in measurement,
since Massey and Zenteno (2000) ﬁnd the MMP and ENADID match well along a number of dimensions, including
migration prevalence, when compared over similar communities.
33Appendix 1: Data Sources
U.S. State Level Unemployment Rates:T h eo !cial State-level unemployment rates available from
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics begin in 1970. Unemployment data from 1962-1974 was obtained
from “Area Trends in Employment and Unemployment”, U.S. Department of Labor, Manpower Ad-
ministration, Bureau of Employment Security, monthly reports. Data on the insured unemployment
rate as a percentage of covered employment was obtained for 1954-69 from “Unemployment In-
surance Claims”, Department of Labor, Bureau of Employment Security, weekly reports, and was
t a k e na tt h ee n do ft h eﬁrst week in September each year. This data was used to extrapolate back
the state-level unemployment rate using the formula predicted state unemployment in year t equals
insured unemployment rate in year t multiplied by the 1962 actual state unemployment rate divided
by the 1962 insured unemployment rate. For California, historic unemployment data obtained from
the California Employment Development Department matched closely with the spliced series created
here.
Real Exchange Rate: Exchange rate data from 1940-73 and the Mexican CPI were obtained from
“Estadísticas Históricas de México”, Third Edition, INEGI (1994):Aguascalientes. Annual average
Exchange rate and CPI data for Mexico from 1970 onwards were obtained from the Bank of Mexico
website www.banxico.gob.mx. U.S. CPI data were obtained for the entire period from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics.
Distance to Major U.S. destination(s) for MMP communities: For each MMP community, the
personal data information ﬁle was used to extract the most popular two locations in the U.S. for
the ﬁrst migrant trip. Then driving distance in miles from the MMP municipality to each of the
two U.S. locations was then calculated from mapblast.com. Distance to the most popular location
and popularity-weighted average distance to the top two locations were both constructed for each
community.
34Appendix 2: Measuring Wealth and Inequality
The wealth and inequality measures in this paper are based on asset indicators, since income and
consumption data are not directly available in the migration surveys. Table A1 provides a summary
of the principal component scoring factors a in equation (13), and the dierent asset indicators
available for use in the MMP and ENADID surveys, for which data also exists in the ENIGH
surveys. The MMP survey contains a much broader range of indicators than the ENADID, with
yes/no questions on ownership of household durables such as a car, radio, and fridge, as well as
data on household infrastructure and building materials. The ﬁrst principal component appears to
be measuring wealth, and is internally consistent in the sense that mean ownership of each asset
is increasing across terciles, while poor materials such as dirt ﬂoors and water piped outside of the
house, are decreasing with the overall asset index. The key requirement for the index Ic to be a
good proxy for wealth inequality across communities is that there is a su!ciently broad class of asset
indicators collected so as to allow for dierentiation in living standards across households. Graphing
the probability density function of the asset index enables one to see if the distribution is clumped
into a small number of groups or truncated at one end.
Figure 5 plots the probability density function of the asset index for each of the two surveys. The
MMP density is smooth, with no signs of clumping, and does not have truncated tails, suggesting
that the relative inequality measure based on this index will perform well. In contrast, the smaller
number of indicators available for the ENADID survey results in some clumping of the asset index
values. In addition, there do not seem to be su!cient indicators to fully distinguish among the top
households, leading to truncation of the top tail. The relative inequality measure, Ic, is therefore
less likely to be a satisfactory measure of inequality for the ENADID.
While Ic c a nb eu s e dt oo b t a i nam e a s u r eo fi n e q u a l i t yi nw e a l t hu s i n gt h eM M Po rE N A D I D
survey alone, we would also like to consider the eect of migration on inequalities in income and
consumption. The ENIGH surveys contain data on income, consumption, and many of the same
asset indicators as are in the migration surveys. These surveys were taken in 1984, 1989, 1992, 1994,
1996 and 1998. For the MMP surveys, we use the closest ENIGH survey to the survey year to predict
35Figure 5: Density Function of Asset Index constructed from MMP and ENADID samples
inequality, while the 1992 and 1998 ENIGH surveys are used to predict inequality for the 1992 and
1997 ENADID surveys respectively. Consumption and Income were converted into real 1998 pesos
using the consumer price index provided by the Bank of Mexico. With these auxiliary surveys we use
the bootstrap prediction method of McKenzie (2003) to obtain predicted inequality in consumption
and income. We outline the method for the MMP data, noting where dierences arise when using
the ENADID. The ﬁrst step is to use the ENIGH survey to regress log of non-durable consumption
(lndc) on the vector of asset indicators x and a vector of household demographic controls w:
lnndci = 
0xi + 0wi + %i (19)
This equation is carried out only for households in the same states as are in the MMP data (and using
all states for the ENADID), and only for households in communities of less than 100,000 population.
The residuals from this regression b %i,are then divided into two groups, according to whether they
correspond to a principal component above or below the median. Then using the MMP data,
for household j in group g, we draw (with replacement) an e %j from the empirical distribution of
residuals for households in group g, and use this to obtain the predicted non-durable consumption
for household j :








36The Gini coe!cient of predicted non-durable consumption is then calculated for each MMP or
ENADID community. This procedure is repeated 20 times and we take the mean Gini over all
replications. Likewise, one can replace non-durable consumption with household income and repeat
the process.
Using this procedure, McKenzie (2003) ﬁnds a rank-order correlation of 0.85 between actual
and predicted state-level Ginis of non-durable consumption in Mexico, suggesting that this method
provides an appropriate measure of inequality. Since the bootstrapping process samples from the
residuals of actual consumption, the clumping and truncation problems which aect measurement of
relative asset inequality for the ENADID will not be such a concern for the predicted gini of NDC.
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38TABLE 1: SUMMARY STATISTICS OF KEY VARIABLES BY COMMUNITY
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
25th 50th 75th
MMP SURVEY COMMUNITIES
Migration measures for male heads aged 15-49
Proportion making trip within three years of survey 0.230 0.299 0.048 0.126 0.293
Proportion of heads with migrant father 0.190 0.172 0.019 0.150 0.312
Proportion of heads with migrant mother 0.042 0.057 0.000 0.022 0.059
Proportion of heads with migrant brother 0.430 0.231 0.293 0.440 0.589
Proportion of heads with migrant sister 0.155 0.110 0.086 0.140 0.196
Community Migration measures
Current migration prevalence 0.259 0.142 0.158 0.243 0.344
Migration Prevalence 15 years before 0.149 0.113 0.071 0.118 0.209
Proportion of Households with a migrant 15 years before 0.326 0.209 0.198 0.292 0.462
State migration rate in 1924 0.013 0.008 0.007 0.013 0.020
State migration rate in 1955-59 0.025 0.016 0.013 0.025 0.032
Demographics
Proportion of heads aged under 30 0.115 0.046 0.080 0.110 0.150
Proportion of heads aged over 60 0.241 0.067 0.198 0.240 0.285
Proportion of heads with education <6 years 0.630 0.191 0.500 0.602 0.750
Proportion of heads with education  9 years 0.161 0.112 0.065 0.140 0.245
Wealth and Inequality
Community mean of Asset Index -0.506 1.345 -1.130 -0.179 0.511
Community mean of Predicted Ln Non-durable Consumption 8.754 0.270 8.588 8.776 8.945
Community mean of Predicted Non-durable Consumption 8349 2226 6649 8447 10099
Community mean of Predicted Income 7297 2291 5798 6878 8599
Relative Asset Inequality (Ic) 0.871 0.171 0.763 0.882 0.954
Gini of Non-durable consumption 0.406 0.025 0.389 0.404 0.420
Gini of Income 0.443 0.026 0.429 0.442 0.461
Other community variables
Number of bank branches 3.8 7.0 1.0 2.0 4.0
Mean real coyote payment 1970-98 (1998 US$) 549.9 167.8 445.5 533.7 626.7
Minutes to Federal Highway 14.2 21.6 0.0 5.0 20.0
Distance in miles to principal US destination 1715.2 473.4 1646.7 1721.6 1855.3
ENADID MATCHED MUNICIPALITIES
Gini of non-durable consumption 1997 0.403 0.017 0.390 0.404 0.413
Gini of non-durable consumption 1992 0.406 0.017 0.395 0.406 0.416
Gini NDC 1997 - Gini NDC 1992 -0.003 0.021 -0.015 -0.002 0.009
Gini of income 1997 0.452 0.020 0.441 0.453 0.462
Gini of income 1992 0.448 0.014 0.438 0.448 0.456
Relative Asset Inequality (Ic) 1997 0.868 0.186 0.770 0.914 0.976
Relative Asset Inequality (Ic) 1992 0.792 0.212 0.644 0.831 0.968
Migration Prevalence 1997 0.093 0.091 0.011 0.053 0.157
Migration Prevalence 1992 0.080 0.077 0.009 0.055 0.139
Change in Migration Prevalence 1992-97 0.013 0.048 -0.009 0.003 0.040
Proportion of Households with a Migrant 1997 0.211 0.192 0.034 0.160 0.368
Proportion of Households with a Migrant 1992 0.169 0.152 0.023 0.130 0.309
Notes: MMP summary statistics are for the 57 communities in MMP71 with 1990 population below 100,000
          ENADID summary statistics are for the 97 municipalities with populations less than 100,000 that can be matched
PercentilesTABLE 2: PROBIT ESTIMATION OF THE DETERMINANTS OF THE HOUSEHOLD HEAD'S FIRST MIGRATION TRIP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Proxies for Wealth
Log of Non-durable Consumption 0.2871 0.3193 0.2677 0.2339 -0.1174
(2.29)* (2.35)* (2.28)* (2.17)* (0.06)
Log NDC Squared -0.0166 -0.0179 -0.0152 -0.0134 0.0266
(2.33)* (2.33)* (2.29)* (2.19)* (0.11)
Log NDC Cubed -0.0015
(0.17)
Own Education (years) 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008
(4.04)** (4.01)** (3.99)**
Own Education Squared -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(4.94)** (4.85)** (4.79)**
Household Head's Characteristics
Married 0.0152 0.0199 0.0184 0.0184 0.0006 0.0004 0.0004
(1.20) (1.90) (2.01)* (2.02)* (0.71) (0.54) (0.54)
Number of Children Aged under 18 0.0017 0.0019 0.0018 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(1.11) (1.36) (1.38) (1.38) (0.06) (0.14) (0.15)
Community Characteristics
Number of Bank Branches 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001
(1.49) (0.35) (0.40) (0.39)
Mean Real Coyote Payment 1970-98 -0.0057
(1.38)
Any Money Lenders in Community -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0025 -0.0025
(0.01) (0.06) (0.32) (0.32)
Train Station in Community -0.0023 0.0047 0.0011 0.0011
(0.41) (0.64) (0.20) (0.19)
Proportion with less than Minimum Wage in 1970 0.0093
(0.46)
Proportion in Agriculture in 1970 0.0195
(0.78)
Minutes to Federal Highway -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.23) (0.64) (0.35) (0.36)
Distance in Miles to Principal US Destination -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(1.24) (0.86) (1.14) (1.14)
Community and Personal Network
State Migration rate in 1955-59 0.3618
(1.97)*
Proportion of Other Heads in Community with  0.0362 0.0362 0.0198 0.0198 0.0199
migrant experience in period t-1 (2.34)* (2.34)* (4.88)** (4.47)** (4.51)**
Father is a migrant 0.0132 0.0132 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
(1.80) (1.80) (2.66)** (2.57)* (2.57)*
Brother is a migrant 0.0098 0.0098 0.0071 0.0071 0.0071
(1.62) (1.62) (10.30)** (10.10)** (10.06)**
Aggregate Time-varying variables
Average real depreciation over current and last year (*100) -.0047 -0.1026
(1.65) (2.81)**
Average US unemployment rate over current and last year 0.0001 0.0001
(0.53) (0.51)
Average real depreciation * Education of the head (*100) .0088
(1.84)
community fixed effects no no no no no yes yes yes
Observations  3116  2590   2730    2729   2729   100529  95639 95639  
Number of Communities in Sample 57 45  49 49 49 54 54 54
Pseudo-R2 0.007 0.067 0.068 0.089 0.089 0.065 0.068 0.068
Notes:
Coefficients reported are marginal effects representing the change in probability of migration for a discrete change in the dummy variables
and for an infinitesimal change in the continuous variables at the mean.
T-statistics in parentheses, with robust standard errors clustered at the community level.
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All probits except column 1 also include dummy variables for 5 year age group of the household head and are for male household heads
currently in Mexico and aged 15-49.
Migrant status of the father and brother is for three years before the survey year for columns (4) and (5), and for year t-1 in columns (6)-(8).
Probability of First Migrant Trip Occurring in
Survey Year or Year before Survey year
Probability of First Migrant
Trip Occurring in Year tTABLE 3: EFFECTS OF NETWORK ON MIGRATION COSTS AND BENEFITS
3A: Illegality and Migration Costs by level of Migration Prevalence
Characteristics of first migrant trip <0.24 0.24 +
t-stat p-value
Proportion Undocumented 0.90 0.90 -0.21 0.830
Proportion of Illegal crossings which use a coyote 0.82 0.86 -1.94 0.052
Mean cost of coyote if coyote is used (1998 US$) 476 401 3.42 0.001
Proportion staying with community member,
friend or relative upon arrival 0.86 0.88 -0.79 0.430
Proportion of illegal crossings which are
accompanied by friends 0.40 0.41 -0.32 0.750
3B: Method by which migrants obtained their last job in the U.S.
Last U.S. job obtained by: <0.24 0.24 +
t-stat p-value
searching oneself 24.4 19.6 16.42 0.000
recommendation from relative 21.2 22.4 -4.34 0.000
recommendation from friend 18.0 21.4 -12.37 0.000
recommendation from fellow community member 4.0 5.3 -8.92 0.000
contracted 23.5 21.1 8.06 0.000
Notes: all heads aged 15 or over in survey period with migrant experience
Panel 3A is for first-time migrants migrating within 15 years of the survey year.
For MMP71 communities with less than 100,000 population in 1990.
Migration Prevalence Ratio
percent of migrants
Welch test of equality
of means

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































yTable 10: Quantile Regression Estimates of Regression of Wealth 
on 1955-59 Migration Stock
Quantile Intercept Migration Intercept Migration Intercept Migration
0.1 7.369 6.552 -7.127 48.125 7.289 7.809
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.25 7.834 3.770 -4.040 28.095 7.756 4.674
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.5 8.241 2.521 -1.998 12.966 8.245 3.031
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.75 8.628 0.883 -0.459 8.279 8.610 1.478
(0.000) (0.097) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015)
0.9 8.882 0.674 0.876 3.607 9.013 1.207
(0.000) (0.305) (0.000) (0.107) (0.000) (0.082)
Notes:
p-values in parentheses obtained via bootstrap estimation using STATA's qreg command.
All regressions also contain controls for 5 year age group dummies, marital status, 
education, and education squared and are for male heads aged 15-49 years old.
For individuals in MMP71 communities with less than 100,000 population in 1990.
Log Non-durable


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eTABLE A1: PRINCIPAL COMPONENT AND ASSET INDICATOR SUMMARY STATISTICS
MMP Principal Components Index
Scoring
Factors Mean S.D. lowest middle upper
Housing Characteristics
Number of rooms/member 0.154 1.082 0.962 0.737 1.028 1.477
Brick and cement or tile roof 0.167 0.758 0.428 0.590 0.856 0.840
Dirt floor -0.282 0.113 0.317 0.316 0.014 0.000
Wood or tile floor 0.266 0.434 0.496 0.104 0.374 0.821
Utilities
Running water 0.198 0.941 0.236 0.841 0.983 0.999
Sewerage 0.277 0.768 0.422 0.478 0.870 0.986
Electricity 0.199 0.971 0.168 0.917 0.999 1.000
Telephone 0.258 0.251 0.434 0.007 0.109 0.649
Durable Assets
Car 0.193 0.187 0.390 0.024 0.106 0.439
Van 0.147 0.183 0.387 0.044 0.168 0.344
Radio 0.162 0.906 0.292 0.797 0.934 0.988
Television 0.264 0.893 0.309 0.703 0.986 0.999
Sewing Machine 0.225 0.475 0.499 0.195 0.473 0.751
Stove 0.276 0.922 0.269 0.769 0.999 1.000
Fridge 0.343 0.670 0.470 0.169 0.855 0.996
Washing Machine 0.310 0.506 0.500 0.079 0.528 0.920
Stereo 0.284 0.454 0.498 0.093 0.398 0.875
Overall Asset Index 0.000 2.154 -2.472 0.363 2.109
Eigenvalue for 1st component 4.639
Share of variance 0.273
Notes: for all 71 communities in MMP71
ENADID 1992 and 1997 Principal Components Index
Scoring
Factors Mean S.D. lowest middle upper
Asset Indicators
House has a dirt floor -0.278 0.208 0.406 0.469 0.115 0.013
House has a wood/tile floor 0.313 0.154 0.361 0.001 0.064 0.411
Water piped into house 0.455 0.363 0.481 0.002 0.147 0.971
Water from pipe outside house -0.286 0.426 0.494 0.621 0.620 0.021
House has a toilet 0.390 0.628 0.483 0.092 0.855 0.998
Toilet connected to running water 0.450 0.341 0.474 0.001 0.192 0.863
Water drains to pipe 0.360 0.315 0.465 0.005 0.296 0.676
Water drains to septic tank 0.087 0.190 0.392 0.054 0.255 0.276
House has electric lighting 0.211 0.899 0.301 0.754 0.963 0.998
Overall Asset Index 0.000 1.843 -1.895 -0.246 2.324
Eigenvalue for 1st component 3.397
Share of Variance 0.377
Notes: For 97 municipalities with population 100,000 or less which can be matched in the 1992 and 1997 surveys.
Means by Tercile of Asset Index
Means by Tercile of Asset IndexBar-Ilan University 
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